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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Of The Case

Nature

Billy

Lee

Joslin, Jr., appeals

guilty of attempted strangulation

from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict ﬁnding him

On

and rape.

appeal, Joslin challenges the

trial

court’s ruling

admitting evidence he argues was inadmissible pursuant t0 I.R.E. 404(b).

Statement

Of The

Facts

On August
p.419, L.2

—

And Course Of The

25, 2016, Joslin strangled and raped his eX-girlfriend, C.D. (Trial Tr., V01.

up with him,

came

by being

On August
III,

Joslin

p.419, L.2

III,

friend because he

t0 her

by sending her

house 0r workplace, but Joslin continued

p.416, L.2

—

p.420, L.17.)

had

— p.421,

When

III,

text

p.416, L.2

L.1.)

was working but went home over

When

she arrived

[her] in a rush,” telling

“just ditched his car”

L.17, p.436, L.23

that point, Joslin “turned

t0 contact C.D.,

she would get home, prompting C.D. to change the

— p.419,

the

noon hour.

home and unlocked

(Trial T11,

her door t0 go inside,

her that he needed to use her phone to call a

and “was running from the cops.”

— p.437,

C.D. asked him “if he was lying.” (Trial

At

p.416, L.1.) After C.D. broke

her house 0r place 0f employment. (Trial Tr., V01.

25, 2016, C.D.

“came up behind

p.420, L.13

at

inside her house

locks. (Trial Tr., V01.

V01.

—

C.D. repeatedly told Joslin that their relationship was over and she asked him to

leave each time he

including

p.410, L.10

Joslin continued t0 contact C.D. “[s]evera1 times a day,” both

messages and by showing up
p.419, L.1.)

Tr., V01. III,

III,

When

p.427, L23.) Joslin and C.D. had dated from late June t0 mid-August 2016,

C.D. broke off the relationship. (Trial

—

Proceedings

(Trial Tr., V01.

L.4.) Joslin followed C.D. into her house,

Tr., V01. III,

p.421, Ls.18-21, p.436, L.23

Where

— p.437,

and grabbed [C.D.] by the neck,” picked her up and took her

III,

L.4.)

t0 her

couch, and “choked [her] out 0f consciousness.” (Trial TL, V01.

When

C.D. came

was

t0, Joslin

still

choking her.

III,

p.421, L.20

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

breathe through her nose and regain consciousness.

L.15.)

moved

then

V01.

Joslin strangled C.D. in

III,

(Trial Tr., V01.

and out of consciousness

He

lost consciousness,

in this

III,

manner
let

p.422, L.12

several times.

—

p.424,

(Id.)

He

everything g0.” (Trial Tr.,

p.423, Ls.6-10.)

moved C.D.

t0 the ﬂoor,

p.424, Ls.19-24, p.425, Ls.22-24.)

C.D. removed her clothes.
clothes, as well,

p.426, Ls.5-16.)

survivor

he told her t0 take off her clothes. (Trial

Believing Joslin would

(Trial Tr., V01.

Again, believing Joslin would

mode” and

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

—

p.425, L.25

III,

and then got on top of C.D. and raped

stop Joslin from raping her.

kill

[her]

couch Where,

d0 to ﬁx

it.”

p.426, L.17

back” and, in an

(Trial Tr., V01.

at Joslin’s direction,

plans with them that

C.D.

sat

weekend and another

III,

0n

II,

p.360, L.21

her if she did not comply,
Joslin

p.426, L.4.)

III,

— p.427,

L.1.)

Instead, she

(Trial Tr., V01.

effort to

make

[her],

III,

his

his lap

and sent one

it

out.”

p.361, L.22.)

“went

in

p.427, Ls.2-17.)

Joslin believe that

might

and touching him and asking

moved

t0 the

text to friends cancelling her

text to her daughter saying that they

—

removed

p.424, Ls.22-24,

p.427, Ls.17-23.) Joslin and C.D.

dinner and that C.D. and Joslin were going to “work

p.430, L.11; Trial Tr., V01.

Tr., V01.

her if she resisted, C.D. did not attempt to

happen, she “started caressing him after he was done raping
[she] could

kill

(Trial Tr., V01.

her.

did “Whatever he wanted [her] t0 do.”

C.D. realized Joslin “just wanted

What

1.)

over her mouth so that she could

her t0 the ﬂoor and “told [her] t0 stop moving and t0

After Joslin

III,

it

L.1

p.422, Ls.9-14.)

squeezed C.D.’s throat “[e]xtremely hard” With both hands until she again
then removed one of his hands from her throat and placed

— p.422,

(Trial Tr., V01.

needed

III,

to

have

p.427, L.24

—

While they were on the couch, C.D.

saw a
III,

r011

0f duct tape that had not been there before Joslin came over that day. (Trial TL, V01.

p.433, Ls.5-19.)

At approximately 1:30
V01.

II,

p.248, L.23

— p.250, L.15;

coworkers were going to
p.430, L.23

—

get

won'ying

work

in her car

III,

0n the couch

As

t0

p.43

III,

1,

and pick her up

at the

at

“distraught” and that “[s]omething

III,

true, she

end of the day.

they were leaving, C.D. saw the

C.D. arrived back

crying, her eyes

(Trial Tr., V01.

suggested that he drive

(Trial Tr., V01.

C.D.’s apartment.

left

r011

III,

1,

L.23

(Trial Tr., V01.

II,

p.433, Ls.5-25.)

(Trial Tr., V01.

II,

were very red and swollen, she had scratches on her

p.250, L.20

—

p.253, L.19, p.273, L.13

—

III,

of duct tape she had previously seen

work her coworkers immediately noticed

was wrong.”

p.43

that she

face, she

p.274, L.13, p.364, L.2

—

was

C.D. was

p.364, Ls.2-8.)

complained that

her neck hurt, her voice was raspy, and bruises were starting to develop on her neck. (Trial
V01.

III,

Ls.10-19.) C.D. kept telling Joslin that she

convince him that was

in Joslin’s pocket. (Trial T11, V01.

When

soon.

C.D. had blood on her face from a scratch on her nose, and Joslin

p.433, L.1.) Joslin agreed t0 d0 so and he and C.D.

p.432, Ls.16-23.)

work

(Trial T11,

C.D. told Joslin that her

p.430, Ls.12-18.)

she did not return t0

if

(Trial Tr., V01.

off.

it

Trial Tr., V01.

back together with him and,

her back to

—

start

p.431, L.9.)

allowed her t0 wash

would

p.m., C.D. began receiving texts from her coworkers.

p.367, L9.)

Tr.,

She told

her coworkers that Joslin had strangled and raped her, prompting her coworkers t0 immediately

call 911.

(Trial Tr., V01.

Trial Tr., V01.

III,

II,

p.253, Ls.8—14, p.275, L.4

p.475, Ls.22-24.)

When

—

p.277, L.14, p.365, L.1

—

p.366, L.5;

ofﬁcers responded they also observed that C.D.

appeared t0 have been injured; her “eyes were puffy and red, almost bulging,” “[s]he had blood
inside her eyes

that

covered about 50 percent of the Whites 0f her eyes,” and “her voice was

really raspy.” (Trial Tr., V01.

II,

p.341, L.20

— p.342,

L.4.)

After being interviewed by police

medical examination and a sexual assault

room physician who

initially

at

her workplace, C.D. went to the hospital for a

(Trial Tr., V01.

kit.

examined her noted

that

II,

p.342, Ls.5-13.)

C.D. “was distraught” and “had clearly

suffered injuries,” including “abrasions around the neck” and “subconjunctival

”bleeding over the white parts 0f both eyes.”
sexual assault nurse examiner

made

The emergency

(Trial Tr., V01.

p.157, L.13

II,

—

hemorrhages”—

similar observations, noting C.D. complained 0f

and had “some abrasions under her

axilla,” “linear

neck pain

marks through her neck,” “some petechia

under both eyes,” and “subconjunctival hemorrhages in both eyes.”

(Trial Tr., V01.

II,

p.308,

L.22 — p.313, L.5.) She also had an abrasion “0n her right thigh, next to her groin.” (Trial
V01.

II,

p.313, Ls.6-9.)

Both the emergency room physician and the sexual

concluded that C.D. had been sexually assaulted.

conﬁrmed
L25;

semen

the presence 0f Joslin’s

Trial Tr., V01.

The

state

III,

p.508, L.15

II,

(Trial

TL,

T11,

assault nurse

p.161, Ls.18-24, p.313,

and Joslin as part of sexual assault

in C.D.’s vagina.

— p.51 1,

V01.

p.291, L.7

II,

kits

— p.297,

L.17.)

charged Joslin With attempted strangulation, rape, and a persistent Violator

enhancement.1 (R., pp.172-74.) Before

be permitted to introduce in
404(b).

(Trial Tr., V01.

A later analysis of swabs obtained from C.D.

Ls.15-20.)

A

p.161, L.17.)

(R., pp.249-70.)

its

trial,

the state ﬁled a motion in limine requesting that

it

case in chief evidence of other uncharged acts under I.R.E.

Speciﬁcally, the state sought t0 introduce evidence that “on July 30,

2006,” approximately 10 years before he committed the attempted strangulation and rape 0f C.D.
in

this

case,

“Mr.

Joslin

entered

into

his

estranged

wife’s

unconsciousness and then raped her.” (R., pp.249, 25 1.) The

1

The

trial.

state originally also

state

charged Joslin With kidnapping, but

(ﬂ R., pp.175-76, 179-80, 288-90.)

it

home,

strangled

supported

its

her

into

request With the

dismissed that charge before

2006 attempted strangulation and rape Which,

police reports 0f the

as

summarized by the

state

below, showed the following:
In the July 30,

2006 rape and attempted

into his estranged wife’s

placing

a

piece

home

0f duct

strangulation, Mr. Joslin entered

early in the morning.

tape

over

her

mouth.

She awoke

He

Mr. Joslin

t0

her

strangled

into

unconsciousness and, after she regained consciousness, raped her. His method of
strangulation
point,

was

“They struggled

peculiar:

all

around the room, and

he took his hands off her neck and put his hand over his mouth

her mouth.

at

[sic]

some
over

[The Victim] reported that the suspect then went back t0 choking her

9’

(R.,

p.254 (internal citations omitted);

ﬂ

211$ R., pp.225-39, 256-70 (police reports submitted as

exhibits in support of state’s m0tion).)

Relying on the marked similarities between the

circumstances of Joslin’s 2006 conduct and the conduct that formed the bases of the charges in

this case, the state

plan,

argued that evidence of the 2006 incident was relevant t0 show “a

method 0r scheme 0f sexually

the proffered evidence

was

assaulting

women.”

(R., pp.253-54.)

The

common

state also

argued

relevant to rebut any defense claim that C.D. “consented to the rape.”

(R., pp.254-55.)

After entertaining brieﬁng and holding a hearing (R., pp.217-24, 25 1-55; 3/30/17 TL), the
district court

(R.,

issued a

pp.199-214).

memorandum

The court found,

decision and order granting the state’s I.R.E. 404(b) motion

ﬁrst, that,

based on the police reports, there was “sufﬁcient

evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the [2006] act occurred and that [Joslin] was the
actor.”

Joslin

(R., pp.201-05.)

committed

in

Next, the court found there were “stark” similarities between the acts

2006 and the

acts for

which he was being prosecuted

in this case.

p.209.) Speciﬁcally, the court explained:

In both cases the Defendant

is

alleged t0 have committed very speciﬁc acts against

a female that he had previously been in a romantic relationship with.

In both

cases these females are alleged t0 have ended the relationship, asked Defendant t0

leave

the

residence,

and rebuffed

Defendant’s

attempts

at

reconciliation.

(R.,

Moreover, Defendant

is

alleged to have entered A.J.’s [his estranged Wife]

unknown

against her will and

t0 her,

and Defendant

is

room

alleged t0 have surprised

C.D. by waiting at her residence and entering without permission. Defendant is
alleged t0 have restricted both women’s airway by alternately squeezing their
necks with his hands and by covering their mouths With his hand. The State has
alleged that Defendant would restrict their breathing to the point the women lost
consciousness and then remove his hand from their mouths to allow them to
recover. Defendant

is

then alleged to have forcibly raped C.D. and A.J. While they

were brought in and out of consciousness in this manner. Both the allegations
stemming from the 2006 incident and those stemming from the current case
demonstrate that remarkably similar planning and preparation was involved and
that it is likely the same person committed both alleged offenses.
Finding “[t]he circumstances surrounding the alleged conduct are so similar that

(R., p.209.)

they objectively tend to demonstrate that the same person committed both acts,” the district court
“determine[d] as a matter of law that” the proffered I.R.E. 404(b) evidence was “relevant for a
permissible purpose, speciﬁcally, t0

show

a

common scheme

0r plan.” (R., p.210.) Finally, the

2006 incident

court engaged in an I.R.E. 403 balancing analysis and concluded that, although the

was remote

in time, the lack

in the alleged conduct

of temporal proximity was overcome by the “substantial similarity”

and “the probative value of the evidence sought

greater than any prejudice t0 Defendant resulting

Approximately one week before
reconsider

68.)

its

The

adhering to

V01.

III,

admission.” (R., pp.210-12.)

motion requesting

Joslin ﬁled a

denied the motion after a hearing, reiterating

between the 2006 incident
its

trial,

p.540.)

and the alleged

ruling that evidence 0f the

common scheme
At

its

be admitted [was]

that the court

order granting the state’s motion to present I.R.E. 404(b) evidence.

district court

similarities

trial,

from

t0

its

(R.,

ﬁnding

— p.24,

the state called Joslin’s eX-wife, A.J., as

that “the

facts in this case are remarkabl[e]”

2006 incident was relevant and admissible

or plan. (8/17/17 Tr., p.20, L.6

pp.164-

t0

and

show

a

L.21; R., pp.157-58.)

its last

witness.

(E generally Trial

Tr.,

Following an offer of proof regarding the precise substance 0f A.J.”s testimony

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.522, L.12

III,

—

A.J.’s testimony

p.516, L.1

—

p.521, L.4), and over Joslin’s renewed objection (Trial Tr., V01.

p.524, L.1), the district court indicated

was admissible

(Trial T11, V01.

III,

it

in,

it

really does

although the evidence

is

was

relevant “really t0

the admission of prior

all

this case

go to the exceptions in Rule 404(b)
of certainly prior bad acts” (Trial

L25). The court further concluded

that,

[its]

“have such hallmarks 0f

that allow the evidence to

T11, V01. III,

p.525, L.21

bad

acts evidence, including “[m]0tive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

its

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.529, Ls.1-16.)

prior determinations that the probative value of the proffered

evidence was not “substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”

— p.530,

p.528,

of the other purposes listed” in I.R.E. 404(b) as permissible bases for

Finally, the court adhered to

p.529, L.17

—

come

with the exception of identity, the proffered testimony

plan, [and] certainly absence 0f mistake or accident.”

III,

ruling” that

p.530, L5), again ﬁnding that Joslin’s

conduct With A.J. and his alleged conduct With C.D. in
similarity that

would “stand by

(Trial Tr., V01.

L.12.)

Consistent with the state’s offer 0f proof, A.J. testiﬁed before the jury t0 the following:

On
V01.

July 30, 2006, she and Joslin were married but were separated and living apart.

III,

p.541, Ls.15-25.) Before going to bed on the night 0f July 30, 2006, A.J. “barricaded the

doors with chairs” and “secured the windows with sticks.”
A.J. fell asleep but later

awoke because

Joslin’s

was duct tape over her mouth, and she could not
L.5,

(Trial T11,

p.548,

Ls.3-8.)

consciousness.

Joslin

“remove[d] his hands from

[her]

III,

III,

“hands were wrapped around
breathe. (Trial TL, V01.

was “squeezing”

(Trial Tr., V01.

(Trial Tr., V01.

A.J.’s

p.543, Ls.6-9.)

neck and,

When

at

III,

p.542, Ls.1-12.)

[her] throat,” there

p.542, L.21

some

point,

— p.543,
she lost

she regained consciousness, Joslin

neck” and put them over her mouth, so that she was “[b]arely”

“able to breathe through her nose.”

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.543, L.10

—

p.544, L.5.)

Joslin did

this—”put his hand over
multiple times.

by

[A.J.’s]

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

mouth and allow[ed]
p.544, Ls.6-1

1.)

through [her]

[her] t0 breathe

nose”—

After he strangled A.J., Joslin “raped [her]”

“insert[ing] his penis into [her] vagina against [her] Will.”

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.544, Ls.12-

22.)

Immediately following A.J.’s testimony, the parties rested. (Trial

—

p.549, L.1.)

p.549, L.3

The

— p.559,

district court thereafter

gave the jury

its

p.548, L.19

Tr., V01. III,

ﬁnal instructions (Trial

L.13), including an instruction directing the jury that

T11, V01. III,

could only consider

it

the evidence 0f Joslin’s other crimes “for the limited purpose 0f proving the defendant’s motive,

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, or absence 0f mistake or accident” (Trial T11,

V01.

III,

p.554, L.19

— p.555, L3;

The jury found

R., p.97).

Joslin guilty as charged of attempted strangulation

admitted the persistent Violator enhancement. (Trial
L.21 — p.601, L.7; R., p.73.)

imposed concurrent ﬁxed

life

The

T11, V01. III,

district court entered

and rape, and Joslin

p.591, L.14

— p.594,

L.4, p.595,

judgment on the jury’s verdict and

sentences. (R., pp.62-64.) Joslin timely appealed. (R., pp.53-57.)

ISSUE
Joslin states the issue

Did

0n appeal

as:

the district court err and abuse

its

discretion

by allowing

the State t0 introduce

and highly prejudicial testimony that Mr. Joslin strangled and raped his
eX-Wife ten years before committing the alleged strangulation and rape in this
irrelevant

case,

and did

that error surely contribute t0 the verdicts?

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

The
The

1.)

state rephrases the issue as:

district court

applied the correct legal standards and found evidence that Joslin had strangled

and raped his eX-wife using the same techniques he used

to strangle

relevant to matters other than propensity and not unfairly prejudicial.
error in the district court’s ruling?

and rape C.D. was both

Has

Joslin failed to

show

ARGUMENT
Has Failed To Show Error

Joslin

A.

In

The

District Court’s I.R.E. 404(b)

Ruling

Introduction

The

district court

permitted the state t0 present evidence

strangled and raped his eX-wife using the

same techniques he used

that,

to

in July 2006, Joslin

accomplish the attempted

strangulation and rape of C.D. in this case. (R., pp.157-58, 199-214; Trial Tr., V01.

—

2006 was not relevant

for

any proper purpose in his prosecution for the attempted

strangulation and rape of C.D. and, even if relevant, “whatever slight probative value”

“heavily outweighed”

arguments

fail.

by

the danger 0f unfair prejudice.

t0

Application 0f the law to the facts found by the

prove Joslin’s motive,

A

and raping C.D.

correctly exercised

was not

district court

its

by

the evidence

common scheme

and absence of mistake or accident

its

danger 0f unfair prejudice.

the evidence, any such error

is

or plan

in strangling

district court

Alternatively, even if the

was harmless.

a question of law reviewed de novo, while balancing under I.R.E. 403

reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

1).

a

Of Review

Relevance

App. 201

show

Joslin’s

discretion in concluding the probative value 0f the challenged evidence

by admitting

Standard

had was

supports the court’s

review 0f the record and the applicable law also shows the

substantially outweighed

court erred

B.

intent, preparation,

it

(Appellant’s brief, pp.12-27.)

determination that the challenged evidence was relevant both t0

and

p.525, L.1

Joslin challenges the court’s evidentiary ruling, arguing evidence 0f his conduct

p.530, L.12.)

in

III,

State V. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190,

254 P.3d 77, 91

is

(Ct.

Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are also reviewed under a bifurcated standard: whether

is

admissible for a purpose other than propensity

10

is

given free review While the

determination of Whether the probative value of the evidence

potential for unfair prejudice

51,

is

trial

trial

V. Grist,

by

its

147 Idaho 49,

court’s discretionary decision, this Court

court correctly perceived the decision as discretionary, whether the

court acted within the boundaries 0f

trial

substantially outweighed

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion. State

205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). In reviewing a

evaluates Whether the

is

its

Whether the court exercised reason in making

discretion and consistent with legal standards, and

its

decision.

M,

15 1 Idaho at 190, 254 P.3d at

91.

The District Court Correctly Concluded The
Not Unfairly Preiudicial

C.

T0 be

Prior

admissible, evidence must be relevant.

Bad Act Evidence Was Relevant And

Evidence that tends

I.R.E. 401, 402.

to

W

prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has any tendency to make the
existence of that fact

HLker, 115 Idaho

more probable than

it

would be Without the evidence,

character of a person in order t0

52,

205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009).

other than that prohibited

52,

show

by

205 P.3d

at

I.R.E. 404(b));

not admissible to prove the

ﬂ alﬂ

J_oy,

State V. Joy, 155 Idaho

ml, gg, State

“However, such evidence

I.R.E. 404(b).” State V.

1) (citations omitted);

is

action in conformity therewith.’”

304 P.3d 276, 283 (2013) (quoting

App. 201

relevant.

544, 547, 768 P.2d 807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).

“Generally, ‘[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts

1, 8,

is

may be

V. Grist,

147 Idaho 49,

admissible for a purpose

Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 249 P.3d 1169

155 Idaho

at 8,

304 P.3d

at

283;

Gr_ist,

(Ct.

147 Idaho

at

1188 (“Evidence 0f uncharged misconduct must be relevant to a material and

disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” (citations omitted». Under

I.R.E. 404(b), evidence

of prior wrongs or acts

may be

admitted t0 prove,

among

other things,

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or

11

“The

845 P.2d 1211 (1993).

disposition.”

147 Idaho

283; State

V. Phillips,

except Where

it

its

_, 423 P.3d 463, 465 (2018) (internal quotations

App. 2010)).

205 P.3d

“Of

at

wrong

course, evidence of a prior crime,

Li

probative value

is

App. 2014)

(citing Gr_ist,

1190; State V. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459, 463, 235 P.3d 409, 413 (Ct.

character While also being relevant and admissible for

listed in the rule.”

its

tendency t0 demonstrate the defendant’s propensity t0 engage in such

State V. Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 876, 341 P.3d 586, 593 (Ct.

at 54,

123 Idaho 178,

tends t0 prove only criminal

Thus, evidence runs afoul 0f Rule 404(b) only “if

dependent upon

behavior.”

trial,

State V. Salinas, 164 Idaho 42,

citations omitted).

entirely

at

one of inclusion which admits evidence of other

rule represents

crimes or acts relevant t0 an issue in the

and

304 P.3d

I.R.E. 404(b); J_oy, 155 Idaho at 8,

accident.

(citing State V. Pepcorn,

0r act

may

implicate a person’s

some permissible purpose, such

as those

152 Idaho 678, 688-89, 273 P.3d 1271, 1281-82

(2012)).

“Admissibility of evidence 0f other crimes, wrongs, or acts

purpose

trial

is

subject t0 a two-tiered analysis.”

court must determine Whether there

wrong

as fact” and, if there

is,

is

Gr_ist,

147 Idaho

at 52,

When

offered for a permitted

205 P.3d

at 1188.

“First, the

sufﬁcient evidence to establish the other crime or

Whether evidence 0f the uncharged misconduct

is

“relevant t0 a

material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other than propensity.” Li. (citations

omitted);

m1 P_em,

152 Idaho

at

688, 273 P.3d at 1281; State V. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,

667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (2010). “Second, the

trial

court

must engage

in a balancing

under I.R.E.

403 and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative
value of the evidence.” Li. (citations omitted);

1281-82;

Johﬂ,

148 Idaho

at

mi Paw,

667, 227 P.3d at 921.

“The

152 Idaho

trial

court

at

688-89, 273 P.3d at

must determine each 0f

these considerations of admissibility on a case-by—case basis.” Li. (citation omitted).

12

In ruling

0n the admissibility of the prior

case, the district court

act evidence the state sought t0 introduce in this

engaged in the two-step admissibility analysis

above.

set forth

The court

found, as a threshold matter, that the state presented “sufﬁcient evidence to support a reasonable

conclusion that the [2006 strangulation and rape 0f Joslin’s estranged Wife] occurred and that

was

[Joslin]

the actor.”

(R., p.205.)

It

then determined, based 0n the facts of this case, that

evidence of the 2006 strangulation and rape was both relevant for purposes other than
propensity—speciﬁcally, to show a

intent, preparation, plan,

pp.205-14;

ﬂ

common scheme

0r plan and t0 prove motive, opportunity,

and absence 0f mistake or accident—and not unfairly

211$ Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.525, L.21

— p.530,

L.4.)

On

prejudicial.

appeal, Joslin does not

challenge the court’s ﬁnding that the state established the 2006 strangulation and rape as

fact.

argues, however, that the court erred in concluding evidence 0f Joslin’s conduct in the

incident

was

relevant for any purpose other than propensity and that

it

(R.,

abused

its

He

2006

discretion in

ﬁnding the probative value 0f the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. For the reasons that follow, Joslin has failed to

1.

show

the district court erred.

And Raped His Ex-Wife In The Same
To Have Strangled And Raped C.D. Was Relevant T0 Show

Evidence That Joslin Had Previously Strangled

Manner He Was Alleged

A Common Scheme Or Plan
“[E]Vidence 0f a defendant’s prior conduct
existence of a

Idaho

at 54,

common

common scheme

205 P.3d

at

criminal design

or plan.”

J_oy,

155 Idaho

1190 (“Where relevant
is

may be

admissible Where

at 9,

304 P.3d

t0 the credibility

at

284;

of the

it

demonstrates the

ﬂ alﬂ

parties,

Gr_ist,

evidence of a

admissible.” (internal quotations and citation omitted».

admitting prior bad act evidence under the

common scheme and

Courts

plan rubric must do so with

caution, however, so as “to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that

13

147

is

merely probative

of the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal behavior.”
at

1189;

rubric

ﬂ alﬂ Paw,

is

t0

152 Idaho

be used, there must be

criminal propensity.” (quoting

at

common

Johﬂ,

characteristics that

148 Idaho

Li. at 54-55,

205 P.3d

quotations and citation omitted).

similar does not

by

at

common scheme

304 P.3d

at 9,

Johﬂ,

148 Idaho

characteristics that

at

304 P.3d

M,

this

at

Paw,

means

that “evidence

and

was planned

at 10,

charged and uncharged conduct

0f prior conduct evidence to show a

is

common

284. Rather, in the absence 0f direct evidence

must ‘bear such a

common plan may be

152 Idaho

at

inferred.’” J_oy,

ﬂ alﬂ

689, 273 P.3d at 1282);

common

go beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead must obj ectively

details

304 P.3d

all

the acts.”). According t0 the Idaho

of the charged conduct, but must instead show that the
is

linked in a

way that

as part of a course of conduct leading

at

Supreme

0f prior misconduct must show more than a superﬁcial

defendant’s charged and uncharged conduct

155 Idaho

one that “embrac[es] the

668, 227 P.3d at 922 (“The events must be linked by

at

similarity t0 the nature

prior conduct

is

or plan, “the evidence of uncharged conduct

284 (quoting

or plan

g0 ‘beyond merely showing a

0r plan

fact that the

tend to establish that the same person committed

Court in

common scheme

668, 227 P.3d at 922)).

resemblance t0 the charged offense that the existence 0f a
155 Idaho

205 P.3d

1190-91 (emphasis original, ellipses added, internal

“The mere

at 9,

at 53,

each other that proof of one tends t0 establish

t0

itself establish the admissibility

scheme or plan.” _oy, 155 Idaho
showing a

at

common scheme

commission of two 0r more crimes s0 related
....”

147 Idaho

689, 273 P.3d at 1282 (“If the

For purposes of Rule 404(b), a

the other

Gr_ist,

up

permits the inference that the

to the

charged offense.” Jﬂ,

285.

Application of the above legal principles to the facts of this case supports the
court’s conclusion that evidence that Joslin

had previously strangled and raped

14

district

his eX-wife in the

same manner he was alleged
scheme or

The

plan.

t0

have strangled and raped C.D. was relevant t0 show a

common

go” of C.D.

after she

state’s theory at trial

broke up with him, leading him t0 enter her

was

that Joslin “couldn’t let

home

Without permission, strangle her in and out of

consciousness, and have sexual intercourse With her against her will.

L.13 — p.146, L.7; Trial

Tr., V01. III,

p.559, L.15

—

p.573, L23.)

(Trial Tr., V01.

Joslin’s theory,

II,

p.141,

on the other

hand, was that C.D. consented t0 the sexual intercourse and that the injuries she sustained

resulted

from “autoerotic asphyxiation.”

Ls.18-22, p.319, Ls.9-12; Trial Tr., V01.

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.574, L.5

relationship but

propensity.”

from

Whom

E Johﬂ,

— p.581,

woman

a prior occasion, strangled and raped another

p.146, L.14

II,

With

—

p.149, L.10, p.166,

L.2.)

Evidence that Joslin had, on

whom

he had been in a romantic

he was separated was not evidence “merely showing a criminal

148 Idaho

at

668, 227 P.3d at 922.

To

the contrary, a review of the

record and the district court’s undisputed factual ﬁndings shows that the uncharged conduct
“bear[s] such a resemblance to the charged offense[]s that the existence of a

common

plan

may

legitimately be inferred.” Li.

As found by

the district court, the similarities

conduct 0f Which Joslin was charged in

this case are

between the uncharged conduct and the

remarkable:

In both cases, Joslin accosted

women with whom he had previously been in a romantic relationship
women by
their

strangling

them

in

and out of consciousness by alternately using

necks and then cover their mouths, raped the

submission, and used and/or had duct tape with

pp.202-03, 209.)

in their

him

women

in the

after

homes, subdued the

his

t0

squeeze

he strangled them into

commission 0f the offenses.

(E R.,

Unlike the “superﬁcial” or “generalized similarities” between charged and

uncharged conduct that the Idaho Supreme Court has held are not sufﬁcient

common scheme

hands

to demonstrate a

or plan, the similarities between the uncharged conduct and the charged

15

offenses in this case are “linked

by common

ﬂ,

course of connected behavior.”

marks and

155 Idaho

at 9-10,

Speciﬁcally, they

citation omitted).

intercourse With

characteristics” that tend to demonstrate a “planned

show

304 P.3d
a plan

by

284-85 (internal quotation

at

Joslin t0 accomplish sexual

women Who have rej ected him by strangling them into
“mere

Joslin argues that

submission.

without evidence that the uncharged conduct was

similarities,

planned as part 0f a course 0f conduct leading up t0 the charged offense, are not enough t0

amount

to a

similarities

common scheme

may

or plan.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.

supported by the law.

Paw,

common

152 Idaho

at

committed the rape of C.D.

home and

plan

227 P.3d

always required,

is

at

“‘bears[s] such a resemblance t0 the charged

inferred.” _oy, 155 Idaho at 9,

The evidence

304 P.3d

in this case

shows

155 Idaho

at 10,

after A.J. terminated the relationship—i.e.,

App. 2017). Instead

304 P.3d

at

or plan

that

by

surprising her

common

t0 the crime,

it

V.

Johﬂ,

148 Idaho

at

The
668-

Comer, 162 Idaho 661, 665, 402

shows “a planned course 0f connected behavior.”

285.

Moreover, Joslin’s argument

common scheme

at

C.D. terminated the relationship using the same blueprint

922-23, or mere opportunistic behavior, State

(Ct.

not

that evidence is

strangling her in and out of consciousness to force her into submission.

P.3d 1114, 1118

J_oy,

it

may be

evidence thus shows more than characteristics

69,

if

689, 273 P.3d at 1282).

after

he used t0 commit the rape 0f A.J.
at

is

Supreme Court has speciﬁcally held

show a common scheme or plan

offense that the existence 0f a

Joslin

that

Rather, as Joslin acknowledges elsewhere in his Appellant’s brief

(Appellant’s brief, p.18), the Idaho

284 (quoting

argument

never lead to an inference of a plan, and therefore some evidence that the

defendant speciﬁcally planned a course of conduct leading to the crime

admissible t0

Joslin’s

17.)

may be

relies

proven.

on

J_oy articulating the

Before

16

it

only theory by which a

decided Jﬂ, the Idaho Supreme Court

recognized that there are “three theories of
linked to the charged conduct to establish a

668

n.3,

227 P.3d 922

bad

courts could require previous

common

be

acts t0

plan under 404(b).” Johnson, 148 Idaho

at

n.3.

most permissive theory

First, the

how

is

that the previous acts

physical and temporal characteristics tending t0

whether consciously chosen or

not.

show

a

must simply share some

common

methodology,

Second, the court might require acts to share

common methodology and that there must be evidence the perpetrator
consciously chose those common techniques. Third, and most restrictive, the
a

court could require the prior acts to actually be linked t0 the charged conduct as
part of an intentionally conceived grand design t0 achieve a speciﬁc criminal
objective.

Li.

(emphasis original, citation omitted).

“most permissive theory”
similarities

Idaho

that

It is

clear that, since Johnson, the Court has rejected the

would admit evidence of uncharged

With the charged offense that tend t0 show a

at 10-1 1,

merely showed
acts admissible

304 P.3d

at

285-86 (declining t0 ﬁnd

common method

of abuse).

common

acts

methodology.

common scheme

under the “most restrictive” theory

if the

ﬂ

at 10,

304 P.3d

at

Where evidence “show[s]

evidence showed the prior acts and

285 (evidence 0f prior misconduct
that the defendant’s charged

that permits the inference that the prior

leading up t0 the charged offense”).

theory that a

is

is

at

668

n.3,

J_oy,

155

admissible under I.R.E. 404(b)

and uncharged conduct

However, the Court’s opinion

in

M

sufﬁcient t0 demonstrate a

evidence that “the perpetrator consciously chose those

Johnson, 148 Idaho

m

is

linked in a

way

conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct

“common methodology” might be

plan Where there

155

would ﬁnd uncharged

charged conduct were linked “as part 0f an intentionally conceived grand design.”
Idaho

J_oy,

or plan Where prior acts

also clear that the Court

It is

based solely on

227 P.3d 922 n.3 (emphasis

original).

did not address the

common scheme

or

common

techniques.”

Under

this theory,

recognized by other courts, there can be n0 question that evidence that Joslin strangled and raped

17

2006 was relevant

his eX-Wife in

common

C.D. to establish a

and rape 0f

in his prosecution for the attempted strangulation

design or plan to sexually assault

women with whom he had been

in

a romantic relationship by strangling them into submission.

The reasoning 0f

State V. Lough,

date with the Victim, P.A.,

feel dizzy

PA. and

having drugged
before

women.
404(b),

Lough—a paramedic—put

trial t0

Li. at 489.

ﬂQ

at

at

M,

889 P.2d

claimed the sexual intercourse was consensual. Li

at

488.

In his

at

488-89.

He

also

exclude evidence that he had previously drugged and raped four other

Applying a

490-91, the

test for admissibility nearly identical t0 that

489-91.

A jury

required under I.R.E.

court denied the motion, ruling the prior acts evidence

trial

by rendering them unconscious by

Q

her.

attempted rape and burglary in the ﬁrst degree,” Lough denied

liberties,

admissible for the purpose 0f showing Lough’s

sexually,”

While on a

is instructive.

something in P.A.’s drink that made her

and disoriented and then sexually assaulted

prosecution for “indecent

moved

889 P.2d 487 (Wash. 1995),

common scheme

or plan t0 “control

women

the surreptitious use of drugs for the purpose 0f abusing

subsequently convicted Lough 0n

all

counts, the

was

them

Washington

Court of Appeals afﬁrmed, and the Washington Supreme Court “accepted review t0 consider

When evidence
proving a

is

admissible under [Washington Rule 0f Evidence] 404(b) for the purpose 0f

common plan or scheme.”

On review,

the

Li. at

489-90.

Washington Supreme Court explained

two

“[t]here are

wherein the ‘plan’ exception to the general ban on prior bad acts evidence

The

ﬁrst “is

where several crimes

constitute constituent parts of a plan in

a piece of the larger plan.” Li. The second “situation arises

and uses

it

When an

common scheme

18

may arise.”

Li. at 491.

which each crime

is

but

individual devises a plan

repeatedly t0 perpetrate separate but very similar crimes.”

“urge[d]” the court “to hold that

different situations

Li Although Lough

or plan evidence under [Rule] 404(b)

is

admissible only if a causal connection exists between the prior acts and the act charged” and only
if the “prior act

0f misconduct [was] done in preparation for the charged offense,” the court

“decline[d] t0 set so artiﬁcial a restriction,” ﬁnding “no real beneﬁt from

it

would often bar relevant and

from other jurisdictions “for
evidence of prior acts
prior conduct

is

reliable evidence.”

insight,”

ﬂQ

relevant to establish a

at

Li.

and recogniz[ing]

it

(emphasis original).

Looking

that

t0 cases

491-494, the Lough Court instead held that

common scheme

or plan Where “the evidence of

common

demonstrate[s] not merely similarity in results, but such occurrence 0f

by a general plan 0f which

features that the various acts are naturally t0 be explained as caused

Q

the charged crime and the prior misconduct are the individual manifestations,”

at

494

(footnoted citations omitted). And, applying that standard t0 the facts 0f Lough’s case, the court

“conclude[d] that the prior misconduct evidence was admitted for a proper purpose.”

Li.

Speciﬁcally, the court reasoned:

The evidence

that this

Whom

Defendant rendered four other women,

relationships with, unconscious with drugs

and then raped them

establish that the Defendant has a criminal disposition or a

is

he had

not admitted t0

bad

character;

it is

admitted to show that he committed the charged offense pursuant to the same
design he used in committing the other four acts of misconduct. The evidence

admitted t0 show plan, not propensity.

drugging women, With

is

In this case, the Defendant’s history of

Whom he had a personal relationship,

in order to rape

them

While they were unconscious or confused and disoriented evidences a larger
design to use his special expertise with drugs to render them unable to refuse

consent t0 sexual intercourse.

A

rational trier of fact could

ﬁnd

that the

Defendant was the mastermind of an overarching plan.
Li. at

494-95 (emphasis

Among

original).

the cases the

Lough Court

867 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1994), superseded by
128 Cal.Rptr.2d 290 (Cal. App. 2002).

cited as support for

statute

its

holding was People

0n other grounds,

As noted

in

Ewoldt,

as stated in People V. Britt,

Lough, the Ewoldt Court overruled two

California cases that had held that, t0 be admissible as demonstrating a
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V.

common scheme

or plan,

491-92

“all the acts

must be part 0f a

(citing, e.g.,

Ewoldt, 867 P.2d 757.) In so doing, the court cited numerous other cases in which

had “recognized

common

single continuing conception 0r plot.” Lough,

0f uncharged similar misconduct

that evidence

may be employed

at

it

t0 establish a

design 0r plan,” despite the absence 0f evidence indicating the defendant committed the

charged and uncharged acts as part of any grand design. Ewoldt, 867 P.2d
V.

889 P.2d

764-66. In People

at

Lisenba, 94 P.2d 569 (Cal. 1939), for example, the defendant’s prior conduct of marrying a

woman,

obtaining insurance 0n her

life,

and drowning her

in a bathtub t0

make

it

appear her

death was accidental was admissible in his subsequent prosecution for the murder of his second

Wife,

Which he was alleged

t0

have committed in a similar manner, to “demonstrate that both

crimes were committed pursuant to a
”despite the fact that there

continuing plot to

V.

Peete,

kill

common

was nothing

design”—i.e., to murder for ﬁnancial

gain—

had formed a

single,

to indicate that the defendant

both of his Wives.” Ewoldt, 867 P.2d

at

764-65, 767. Likewise, in People

169 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1946), the court held admissible in the defendant’s

murdering her landlord evidence
landlord, concealed the body,

was alleged

t0

that,

24 years

earlier, the

trial

defendant had murdered another

and then assumed the landlord’s property

have committed the offense for Which she was 0n

trial.

in the

As

same manner she

explained by the court

in Peete:

Evidence concerning another offense

is

relevant t0 prove that a death resulted

from the execution 0f a scheme when in the light 0f the circumstances of the
crime sought t0 be proved, it indicates the existence of such a scheme.
When a
defendant’s conduct in connection with the previous crime bears such similarity
in

signiﬁcant respects t0 his conduct in connection with the crime charged as

naturally t0 be explained as caused by a generalplan, the similarity

is

not merely

was directed by design. The striking
between defendant’s conduct in the [earlier] case
and her conduct in connection with [the death of the landlord for Which she was
0n trial] strongly indicates a scheme by defendant to acquire the property 0f a
coincidental, but indicates that the conduct
similarity in signiﬁcant respects

suitable Victim

by murder.
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for

m,

169 P.2d 924 (internal citations and paragraph break omitted, emphasis added), guoted in

Ew_oldt,

867 P.2d

The court reached a

at 765.

similar result in People V. Ing,

1967), concluding evidence that the defendant,

who was

422 P.2d 590

a physician, had previously drugged and

then raped three former patients and a former employee was admissible in his
counts 0f raping another patient after drugging her.

similarities

at

The court

held:

trial

for three

“In View of the striking

between the other offenses and the ones charged the evidence was relevant on the

question of a

867 P.2d

(Cal.

common scheme

766

0r plan to

commit rape

....”

mg, 422 P.2d 590, guoted

in Ew_oldt,

(ellipses in original).

After canvassing

its

prior case law, including

M, m,

and mg, s_um, the Ew_oldt

Court found that two of its prior cases holding “that evidence 0f a defendant’s uncharged similar

misconduct

is

admissible t0 establish a

uncharged acts are part of a
expressly overruled them.

which the defendant’s

common

conception or plot” were “anomalous,” and

single, continuing

Ew_oldt,

867 P.2d

design or plan only where the charged and

at 769.

The court reasoned

that,

identity 0r intent are not at issue, the fact that “the

uncharged offenses committed by a defendant

is

markedly similar

t0 the

it

even in cases in

modus operandi of
charged offense”

is

relevant “t0 establish that the uncharged offenses and the charged offense are manifestations 0f a

common

design 0r plan.”

Li

at

767-68.

“Such evidence,” the court explained,

t0 establish that the defendant has a criminal disposition or

bad

“is

not admitted

character, but t0 prove that

he or

she committed the charged offense pursuant to the same design or plan used in committing the

uncharged criminal

acts.” Li. at 768.

Other courts addressing the issue have also concluded that evidence of prior misconduct

is

admissible for the purpose of showing a

uncharged acts are so similar as

to give rise to

common scheme

0r plan Where the charged and

an inference that the defendant committed the acts

21

pursuant t0 the same design.

E, gg, State V. Sites,

(W. Va. 2019) (where defendant was alleged
lethal

amounts of a controlled substance, evidence

women

substances to

defendant “had a
t0 seduce them”);

2001

to

rape

and engaged

common

S.E.2d

_, 2019 WL 507828,

that defendant

in sexual conduct With

V.

admissible

at

**6-7

have murdered Victim by supplying her with

had previously given controlled

them was relevant

plan or scheme of supplying controlled substances to

Commonwealth

conviction

_

t0 demonstrate

women

in order

Tyson, 119 A.3d 353 (Penn. 2015) (evidence 0f defendant’s
in

his

trial

for

another Victim in 2010

raping

Where

circumstances of each incident “reveal[ed] criminal conduct that [was] sufﬁciently distinctive to
establish [defendant]

“clear pattern

engaged in a

plan or scheme”; speciﬁcally, evidence showed a

Where [defendant] was legitimately

each Victim’s compromised
in the

common

state,”

in each Victim’s

home,” was “cognizant of

and “had vaginal intercourse with each Victim

middle of the night While the Victim was unconscious”); People

(C010. 2002) (Where defendant

location,

and raped

offering

it

to

have offered Victim a

her, evidence that defendant

conduct with four other young
plan because

was alleged

women was

was “evidence from Which

young women a

V.

admissible to show, inter alia, a
the jury could

ride as a ruse to isolate

ﬁnd

her to a secluded

in nearly identical

common scheme

that the defendant

them and have sex with them,

consent”), cited With approval in People V. Jones, 311 P.3d

bedroom

Rath, 44 P.3d 1033

ride, driven

had previously engaged

in her

or

had a history of

regardless of their

274 (Colo. 2013).

This Court should apply the reasoning of the foregoing cases and hold

that,

while

generalized similarities between charged and uncharged conduct are not sufﬁcient to establish a

common scheme

or plan, evidence of uncharged conduct

common scheme

or plan Where the uncharged and charged acts “demonstrate ‘not merely a

similarity in the results, but such a concurrence of

22

may be

common

admissible t0 establish a

features that the various acts are

by a general plan 0f Which

naturally to be explained as caused

the charged crime and the prior

misconduct are the individual manifestations.”’ Ew_oldt, 867 P.2d
Evidence (Chadboum

may be

770 (quoting 2 Wigmore,

Stated differently, this Court should hold that

rev. ed. 1979) § 304, p.249).

evidence of uncharged misconduct

at

admissible to

show a common scheme

0r plan Where

the charged and uncharged acts are so similar in signiﬁcant respects as to indicate that the

defendant “devise[d] a plan and use[d]
crimes.”

M,

precedent.

exists t0

889 P.2d

E, gg,

show

J_oy,

at

155 Idaho

the existence of a

at 9,

304 P.3d

common scheme

t0 the

legitimately be inferred.”’ (quoting

at

repeatedly to perpetrate separate but very similar

490. Adoption 0f this standard

must ‘bear such a resemblance

Idaho

it

at

284

is

consistent with this Court’s prior

(“In cases

where n0

0r plan, the evidence 0f uncharged conduct

charged offense that the existence of a

Paw,

direct evidence

152 Idaho

at

common

689, 273 P.3d at 1282));

690, 273 P.3d at 1283 (prior acts of sexual abuse relevant t0

plan

may

Paw,

152

show common plan Where

evidence showed defendant “made a conscious choice t0 deliberately molest 0r abuse his Wife’s
siblings

and

their children”); Johnson,

necessary t0 demonstrate a

common

common scheme

characteristics that

..

205 P.3d
a

at

at

same person committed

all

admissible

mistake or accident.’” (quoting State
(1991), overruled 0n other grounds

V. Pizzuto,

bV

‘if relevant t0

prove

two 0r more crimes so related

each other that proof of one tends t0 establish the other, knowledge,

It

be linked by

the acts”); Grist, 147 Idaho at 54-

may be

0r plan embracing the commission 0f

(emphasis in original)).

(minimum showing

or plan requires that the “events

1190-91 (“[E]Vidence 0f other bad acts

common scheme

668, 227 P.3d at 922

g0 beyond merely showing a criminal propensity and instead

obj ectively tend to establish that the

55,

148 Idaho

identity, 0r

t0

absence of

119 Idaho 742, 750-51, 810 P.2d 680, 688-89

State V. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991))

also recognizes that there are legitimate instances in
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which a

show

defendant’s prior acts Will be relevant to

the defendant committed the charged acts

pursuant to an intentional design, even though the charged and uncharged acts are not themselves
“part 0f a single, continuing conception or plot.” Ew_oldt, 867 P.2d at

alﬂ

M,

889 P.2d

at

769 (footnote omitted);

491 (declining defendant’s invitation t0 hold

common scheme

ﬂ

0r plan

evidence admissible only where “causal connection exists between the prior acts and the act

charged” and where misconduct was “done in preparation for the charged offense” as doing so

would

set “artiﬁcial a restriction”

reliable evidence”).

Such

is

With “n0 real beneﬁt” and “would often bar relevant and

the case here.

Evidence that Joslin strangled and raped his eX-Wife in 2006 was relevant in Joslin’s
prosecution for the attempted strangulation and rape 0f C.D. because the evidence demonstrated
Joslin’s “pattern of using a particular technique to accomplish a particular end.”

m, 44 P.3d

at

1041.

In this case, the state presented evidence that Joslin, carrying duct tape with him, entered

C.D.’s

home

Without her permission, strangled her in and out of consciousness by alternately

squeezing her neck and covering her mouth with his hand, and then raped her. (Trial
p.419, L.2

— p.433, L25.) Likewise,

in the

2006

Tr., V01. III,

case, Joslin entered his estranged Wife’s

home

Without her permission, covered her mouth With duct tape, strangled her in and out of
consciousness by alternately squeezing her neck and covering her mouth with his hand, and then

raped her.

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.540, L.13

—

p.544, L.22, p.547, L.14

—

p.548, L.8.)

Where, as

here, “a defendant’s conduct in connection With the previous crime bears such similarity in

signiﬁcant respects to his conduct in connection with the crime charged as naturally t0 be

explained as caused by a general plan, the similarity
the conduct

ﬂ

was

directed

also State V. Baker,

by design.”

m,

is

not merely coincidental, but indicates that

169 P.2d 924, guoted in Ew_oldt, 867 P.2d

950 P.2d 486 (Wash.

Ct.

24

App. 1997)

(for purposes

at

765;

0f establishing a

common scheme

0r plan, “[c]onduct

not merely coincidence” (citing

sufﬁciently similar

is

M,

889 P.2d 487)).

respects between” Joslin’s conduct in the

When

“The

2006 case and

the similarity indicates design,

striking similarity in signiﬁcant

his conduct in connection With the

attempted strangulation and rape 0f C.D. “strongly indicates a scheme by” Joslin t0 force

with

whom

he had previously been in a romantic relationship but

into submission in a very particular

way (i.e. by

m,

with them Without their consent.
(“Defendant’s history of drugging

who had

women

since rebuffed

him

strangulation) in order to have sexual intercourse

169 P.2d 924;

ﬂ alﬂ M,

women, with whom he had

889 P.2d

at

495

a personal relationship, in order to

rape them while they were unconscious 0r confused and disoriented evidences a larger design t0
sue his special expertise With drugs t0 render them unable to refuse consent t0 sexual

The evidence 0f

intercourse.”).

propensity,”

On

M,

889 P.2d

at

Joslin’s

2006 conduct was admissible

“show

to

495, and the district court properly admitted

plan, not

for that purpose.

it

appeal, Joslin acknowledges that his charged and uncharged “crimes shared

similarities.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.18.)

He

argues, however, that, absent a

showing

some

that the

“uncharged conduct was planned as part of a course of conduct leading up t0 the charged
offense,” the only time similarities between a defendant’s uncharged and charged conduct are

relevant

is

when

the identity of the perpetrator

is at issue.

(E Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.)

Because “everyone [below] agreed Mr. Joslin’s identity was not

“mere

similarities,

Joslin’s

even ‘remarkable’ or

2006 conduct] relevant

incorrect.

t0

any

‘stark’ ones,

fact

at issue,” Joslin

were not enough

not an issue, that evidence 0f uncharged conduct

if the acts are

“linked

make

of consequence.” (Appellant’s

The Idaho Supreme Court has expressly recognized, even

scheme or plan

t0

by common
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may be

argues that

[the evidence

brief, p.17.)

in cases

Where

identity

admissible t0 demonstrate a

characteristics that

Joslin

0f

is

was

common

go beyond merely showing

a criminal propensity and instead

all the acts.”

Johnson, 148 Idaho

obj ectively tend to establish that the

at

668, 227 P.3d at 922 (emphasis added) (citing,

CLdell, 132 Idaho 217, 220, 970 P.2d 10, 13 (1998); State
P.2d 959, 964-65 (1995)).
(even

when

And

other courts are in accord.

identity is not at issue,

by a defendant

markedly similar

is

V.

119 A.3d

E, gg, Ew_oldt, 867 P.2d at 767-68

where “the modus operandi 0f uncharged offenses committed
t0 the

charged offense,” such

is

relevant “t0 establish that the

common

358-59 (uncharged conduct relevant to establish

at

“evidence reveals criminal conduct Which
signature 0f the

same

e.g., State V.

Tapia, 127 Idaho 249, 254-55, 899

uncharged offenses and the charged offense are manifestations of a

m,

same person committed

perpetrator”).

is

distinctive

design or plan”);

common

and so nearly identical as

t0

plan Where

become

the

Because the evidence shows Joslin’s modus operandi in

committing the 2006 strangulation and rape of his eX-wife was the same as the method by which
he committed the attempted strangulation and rape 0f C.D., such that
signature, the district court correctly concluded the evidence

this case to

it

nearly

became

his

of the 2006 conduct was relevant in

demonstrate the uncharged and charged offenses were manifestations 0f a

common

scheme 0r plan.
Joslin also appears t0 argue that, because the charged

by ten

years,” his

2006 conduct was too remote

and uncharged

“Although remoteness in time

is

common scheme

plan or design, the importance 0f the time period

1g”

Pepcorn,

m,

152 Idaho

119 A.3d

at

at

359

is
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or plan.

common

scheme,

inversely proportional t0 the similarity of the

(internal quotations

687, 273 P.3d at

he

a factor to be considered in

determining the probative value of other crimes evidence under the theory of

crimes in question.”

“were separated

in time to permit a legitimate inference that

committed the attempted strangulation and rape of C.D. as part of a
(Appellant’s brief, p.18.)

acts

and

1280 (afﬁrming

citations omitted);

trial

court’s

ml,

admission of

molestation defendant committed 40 years before charged acts, noting

recognized “that the more remote a prior act was

136 Idaho 721, 727, 39 P.3d 661, 667

it

would

require

more

may

still

be relevant

may be

less similarity

if

required Where the prior act

and

a

common scheme

shows

(R., p.209), thus leading t0

(citing State V.

grounds by

For

Gr_ist,

all

Law,

a prior bad act, despite

its

Conversely,

closer in time to the charged incident.”

As found by the

district court

and

charged and uncharged acts are

Joslin’s

an inference that the acts were manifestations of

or plan. In light of those remarkable similarities, the “issue 0f remoteness

goes to the weight of the evidence, not to

667

is

citation 0mitted)).

detailed above, the evidence in this case

“remarkably similar”

similarity”); State V.

strikingly similar t0 the charged offense.

it is

(ellipses in original, internal quotations

court correctly

App. 2002) (“Remoteness and similarity must be

(Ct.

considered together because the two concepts are so closely related;
remoteness,

trial

admissibility.”

its

La_w, 136 Idaho at 727, 39 P.3d at

Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 746, 819 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1991), overruled on other

147 Idaho 49, 205 P.3d 1185).

of the foregoing reasons, the

2006 strangulation and rape 0f

district court correctly

his eX-Wife

strangulation and rape 0f C.D. t0

show

a

was

concluded evidence of Joslin’s

relevant in his prosecution for the attempted

common scheme

0r plan.

The

court’s relevancy

determination should therefore be afﬁrmed 0n this basis.

2.

The

Challenged

Preparation,

Evidence

Was

Relevant

To

Show

Joslin’s

Motive,

Intent,

And Absence Of Mistake Or Accident

Regardless 0f whether the evidence of Joslin’s 2006 strangulation and rape of his
estranged Wife

was

relevant to

correctly admitted the evidence

show

a

on the

common scheme

or plan, the district court nevertheless

alternative bases that
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it

was

relevant t0 prove Joslin’s

motive, intent, preparation, and absence of mistake 0r accident in strangling and raping C.D.2

E

328 P.3d 539, 545

State V. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565,

(Ct.

App. 2014) (“[E]Vidence may be

relevant for speciﬁc purposes listed under I.R.E. 404(b) (and possibly for other appropriate

purposes not listed in Rule 404(b)) even though the prior conduct

conduct by a

common plan 0r scheme.”

“Motive
particular act.”

generally

is

deﬁned

as that

Which leads or tempts the mind

State V. Stevens, 93 Idaho 48, 53,

(Ct.

App. 2014).

Intent,

and does run afoul 0f the

“when

I.R.E.

the existence of a motive

that the person in question did the act.”

bad

prior

Idaho

acts

at 879,

may be

341 P.3d

i_n

which

at

596

was

trial

district court also

Trial Tr., V01.

was

III,

it

III,

is

more probable

336 P.3d 232, 241

_,

426

intent is a disputed element, “[e]Vidence

relevant to prove the intent element 0f the charged offense.”

p.146, L.7; Trial Tr., V01.

The

make

State V. Capone, 165 Idaho 118,

m,

of

157

(citation omitted).

that,

and

intent

were both

directly at issue.

As

previously noted,

having been rejected by C.D., Joslin entered her

her consent and raped her after strangling her into submission.

2

“Evidence of motive

State V. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308,

Similarly, in cases in

In this case, Joslin’s motive

the state’s theory at

Li.

“is the

404(b) prohibition on impermissible character

(2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cited

P.3d 469, 476 (2018).

i_n

on the other hand,

a circumstance tending t0

is

m

t0 indulge in a

gm

454 P.2d 945, 950 (1969),

purpose t0 use a particular means t0 effect a certain result.”

evidence,

not linked to the charged

(parenthetical notation in orginal)).

Mg 157 Idaho 869, 877, 341 P.3d 586, 594
relevant,”

is

p.559, L.15

— p.573, L23.)

(Trial Tr., V01.

Because the

t0

district court correctly

Without

p.141, L.13

Joslin did not dispute that he

found the challenged evidence was relevant

p.529, Ls.1-16.)

II,

home

—

had sexual

prove opportunity.

(E

concluded the evidence

relevant for other non-propensity purposes, this Court need not reach the district court’s

reliance

on opportunity

as an alternative basis for

28

its

admissibility determination.

intercourse With C.D., but he argued t0 the jury that the sex

injuries resulted

from “autoerotic asphyxiation.”

p.166, Ls.18-22, p.319, Ls.9-12; Trial Tr., V01.

had, 0n a prior occasion, entered the

III,

was consensual and

(Trial Tr., V01.

p.574, L.5

home of a former

II,

p.146, L.14

— p.581,

L.2.)

—

that C.D.’s

p.149, L.10,

Evidence that Joslin

romantic partner without her permission,

placed duct tape over her mouth, strangled her in and out 0f consciousness, and then raped her

tended t0

make

it

more probable

that Joslin

was motivated

t0

accomplish sexual intercourse with

C.D. by forcibly strangling her into submission because she, too, was a former romantic partner

who had

rejected his advances.

Similarly, the evidence that Joslin

had previously strangled and

raped a former romantic partner under circumstances that were strikingly similar t0 the manner in

Which he was alleged

t0

have strangled and raped C.D. was relevant

t0 rebut Joslin’s claim

0f

consent and to show, instead, that Joslin intended to have sexual intercourse with C.D. against
her will by “us[ing] a particular means” (strangulation) “t0 effect a certain result” (submission t0
intercourse).

m,

93 Idaho

at 53,

The challenged evidence was

454 P.2d

at 950.

show

also relevant t0

Joslin’s preparation.

Speciﬁcally,

evidence that Joslin used duct tape in the strangulation and rape of his estranged Wife in 2006

made

it

more probable

that the reason Joslin brought duct tape to C.D.’s apartment

was

in

preparation for overcoming C.D.’s resistance to the strangulation and rape, should the need

present

itself.

Finally, the challenged evidence

As noted
question.

resulted

was

relevant to

show an absence of mistake

0r accident.

above, Joslin did not dispute that he had sexual intercourse With C.D. 0n the day in

He

argued, however, that the intercourse

from “autoerotic asphyxiation.”

Ls.18-22, p.319, Ls.9-12; Trial Tr., V01.

was consensual and

that C.D.’s injuries

—

p.149, L.10, p.166,

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.574, L.5
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II,

p.146, L.14

— p.581,

L.2.)

Evidence that Joslin had

previously strangled and raped his estranged Wife in the same manner he was alleged to have
strangled and raped C.D.

was

directly relevant to rebut Joslin’s claim that C.D.’s injuries

were

the unintentional result of consensual conduct as opposed t0 the result of Joslin’s intentional acts

E, gg,

of strangling C.D. in order to force her into submission.

State V. Ortega, 157 Idaho

782, 788, 339 P.3d 1186, 1192 (Ct. App. 2014) (jury could infer from prior acts of Violence that
injury caused

by defendant’s

was

action or inaction

likely intentional

and unlikely

t0

be

accidental).

Because evidence of the 2006 strangulation and rape of his eX-wife was relevant
issues 0f Joslin’s motive, intent, preparation,

strangle

and absent of mistake and accident

and rape C.D., Joslin’s claim 0n appeal

that the evidence

it

again

999

(Appellant’s brief, p.24)

is

challenged evidence could implicate Joslin’s character.

However, because the evidence was also relevant

common scheme

dependent upon

is

for

wrong or

was a

(E Trial

it

once, he

Like the

district

potential danger that the

Tr., V01. III,

for permissible

E,

gg,

inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b) only

its

p.529, Ls.17-19.)

purposes—to show

Joslin’s

act

Gr_ist,

“when

147 Idaho

its

at 54,

205 P.3d

probative value

is

at

entirely

tendency t0 demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to engage in such

behavior” (emphasis added));
crime,

he did

or plan, motive, intent, preparation, and absence 0f mistake 0r accident—its

admission was not prohibited by I.R.E. 404(b).

1190 (evidence

‘if

necessarily Without merit.

court, the state recognizes that, absent a limiting instruction, there

in attempting t0

“was purely propensity

evidence which invited the jury to draw the impermissible inference that

probably did

t0 the

may

Mg

157 Idaho

at

876, 341 P.3d at 593 (“evidence 0f a prior

implicate a person’s character while also being relevant and admissible

some permissible purpose, such

as those listed in the rule”).

Rather, any potential that the

jury might consider the evidence for an improper purpose could be, and ultimately was,
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addressed with a proper limiting instruction.

(E Trial TL, V01.

III,

p.554, L.19

— p.555,

L.3; R.,

p.97 (Jury Instruction N0. 20 limiting purposes for which jury could consider evidence of prior
crimes).) Joslin has failed to

show

error in the district court’s determination that evidence

2006 strangulation and rape 0f eX-Wife was admissible under

3.

0f his

I.R.E. 404(b).

Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion BV
Concluding That The Probative Value Of The Evidence Was Not Substantially
Outweighed BV Its Potential For Unfair Prejudice

Joslin

Joslin has also failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

concluded that the probative value 0f the prior bad act evidence was not substantially outweighed

by

the danger 0f unfair prejudice.

Pursuant t0 I.R.E. 403, relevant evidence

0f unfair prejudice—Which

in the district court’s discretion, the danger

is

may be

excluded

if,

the tendency t0 suggest

a decision on an improper basis—substantially outweighs the probative value 0f the evidence.
State V. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471,

873 P.2d 905, 908

(Ct.

248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010); State

App. 1994); State

V.

V.

Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654,

Nichols, 124 Idaho 651, 656, 862 P.2d 343, 348 (Ct.

App. 1993).
Rule 403 does not offer protection against evidence that
0f being detrimental t0 a party’s case.

E

604 (1989) (“Certainly

was

evidence in a criminal

that evidence

trial is

F_10Ld,

125 Idaho

“Under the

at

rule, the

is,

State V. Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290,

775 P.2d 599,

prejudicial t0 the defendant, however, almost all

state,

and thus

Rather, the rule protects only against evidence that

is

evidence that tends t0 suggest a decision 0n an improper basis.

654, 873 P.2d at 908.

evidence

merely prejudicial in the sense

demonstrably admitted to prove the case of the

results in prejudice t0 a defendant”).

unfairly prejudicial, that

is

is

As

previously explained by the Idaho Supreme Court:

only excluded

if the
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probative value

is

substantially outweighed

by

The

the danger of unfair prejudice.

relevant evidence.”

rule suggests a strong preference for admissibility of

State V. Martin, 118 Idaho 334,

340

n.3,

796 P.2d 1007, 1013 n.3 (1990)

(emphasis in original).

The

district court

concluded evidence that Joslin strangled and raped his estranged Wife in

2006 was “extremely probative” 0f

Joslin’s “[m]0tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

[and] certainly absence 0f mistake 0r accident” in having allegedly strangled and raped C.D.

(Trial Tr., V01.

p.529, L.1

III,

certainly prejudicial.”

—

The court “concede[d]”

p.530, L.4.)

(Trial Tr., V01.

III,

the evidence

was “most

But, after weighing relevant

p.529, Ls.17-21.)

considerations—including the “temporal remoteness of the two alleged incidents” judged in
relation t0 their “substantial similarit[ies],” as well as the fact that the state only sought to “offer

a single witness to testify about a single prior incident” (R., p.212;

L.23

—

p.24,

admitted

alﬂ

is

L.6)—the court determined

that “the probative value

greater than any prejudice to [Joslin] resulting

Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.529, L.17

— p.530, L.4

from

ﬂ alﬂ

8/17/17 Tr., p.23,

0f the evidence sought to be

its

admission”

(R., p.212;

(court reafﬁrming, after offer 0f proof,

that “the probative value [0f the challenged evidence] is [not] substantially

its

ﬂ

ruling

outweighed by the

danger 0f unfair prejudice”).
Joslin challenges the district court’s discretionary weighing determination, arguing the

“court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards or reach

exercise 0f reason.

its

decision

by an

Speciﬁcally, he takes issue With the court’s

(Appellant’s brief, p.25.)

determination that the similarities between Joslin’s charged and uncharged conduct increased the
probative value 0f the uncharged acts evidence, contending instead that similarities between the

conduct only increased the prejudicial effect 0f the challenged evidence by inviting the jury to
“dr[a]w the impermissible inference that

‘if

he did

32

it

once, he probably did

it

again.”’

(Appellant’s brief, pp.25-27.)

Joslin’s

argument

potential for that prejudicial effect 0f the evidence

it

was not

t0 consider the evidence “to

disposition t0

The

fails.

district court clearly

and ameliorated

it

by

recognized the

instructing the jury that

prove the defendant’s character or that the defendant has a

commit crimes,” but was

to consider

it

“only for the limited purpose of proving the

defendant’s motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 0r absence of mistake or

accident.” (Trial Tr., V01.

III,

p.554, L.19

— p.555, L3;

R., p.97.)

ﬂ,

P_em,

that the jury followed the court’s instruction,

1283, there

is

no

gg,

Assuming, as
152 Idaho

at

this

Court must,

690, 273 P.3d at

risk that the jury considered the evidence for anything other than

its

proper

purposes.

show

Joslin has failed t0

the trial court abused

its

discretion in concluding that, with an

appropriate limiting instruction, the risk of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the

probative value 0f the evidence t0 prove Joslin’s motive and intent in strangling and raping C.D.

m

State V. Marks, 156 Idaho 559,

bad

acts “carried

abuse

its

some

328 P.3d 539

risk that the jury

would use

(Ct.

it

for

App. 2014) (although evidence 0f other
an improper purpose,”

trial

court did not

discretion in concluding that, with a limiting instruction, risk of unfair prejudice did not

substantially outweigh probative value 0f evidence for permissible purpose).

D.

Even

If

The

District

Court Erroneouslv Admitted The Prior Bad Act Evidence, The Error

Was Harmless
Even When

deemed harmless

if

the

trial

court has abused

a substantial right

is

its

discretion, such “abuse

0f discretion

may be

not affected. In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding

evidence, this Court will grant relief 0n appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one

of the parties.”

State V. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363,

I.R.E. 103(a) (“Error

may

247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); accord

not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
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unless a substantial right of the party

is

affected

....”);

I.C.R. 52

(“Any

error, defect, irregularity,

0r variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded”).

harmless

error, the State

must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the error

“To

establish

complained of did

not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State V. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 140, 334 P.3d 806, 814

(2014) (quoting State V. Pegy, 150 Idaho 209, 221, 245 P.3d 961, 973 (2010)). “‘In other words,
the error

State V.

is

harmless

if the

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the same Without the error.”

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

38,

44 (2017) (quoting

State V. Almaraz, 154

Idaho 584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013)).

Even

if the district court

abused

its

discretion in admitting evidence that Joslin

had

strangled and raped his estranged Wife in 2006, the error did not affect Joslin’s substantial rights

and was therefore harmless.

First, the court’s limiting instruction directing the

jury that

it

was

not t0 consider the challenged evidence as proof of Joslin’s character must be presumed to have
eliminated the possibility that the jury might do so.

P.3d

at

1283.

m,

gg,

Paw,

152 Idaho

at

690, 273

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the jury would have reached same result

even Without the challenged evidence because the evidence against Joslin was overwhelming.

m, gg, Montgomegy,

163 Idaho

at 46,

408 P.3d

at

44 (holding error harmless “[b]ased 0n the

overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery
Multiple witnesses

Who saw

at trial”).

C.D. shortly after Joslin was alleged t0 have strangled and

raped her testiﬁed that C.D. was visibly upset and that she had signs 0f obvious injury: her eyes

were red and swollen, she had scratches 0n her
starting to

develop 0n her neck. (Trial

L.13, p.364, L.2

— p.267, L9.)

Tr., V01.

II,

face, her voice

p.250, L.20

was

— p.253,

raspy,

and bruises were

L.19, p.273, L.13

— p.274,

Responding ofﬁcers made similar observations, noting

C.D.’s “eyes were puffy and red, almost bulging,” “[s]he had blood inside her eyes
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that

that

covered about 50 percent 0f the Whites of her eyes,” and “her voice was really raspy.” (Trial TL,
p.341, L.20

—

p.342, L.4.)

The medical professionals who examined C.D. likewise noted

V01.

II,

that

C.D. “had clearly suffered injuries,” including abrasions and linear marks 0n and around her

neck and armpit, petechia, and “subconjunctival hemorrhages in both eyes.”
p.157, L.13

—

p.161, L.17, p.308, L.22

— p.313, L9.)

p.291, L.7

— p.297,

L.24; Trial Tr., V01.

to the jury that C.D.’s injuries

were the

sexual intercourse (Trial Tr., V01.

that C.D.s injuries

III,

III,

p.508, L.15

result

in C.D.’s vagina.

— p.51 1,

of “autoerotic asphyxiation” during consensual

p.575, Ls.2-5), the sexual assault nurse speciﬁcally denied

p.319, Ls.9-12; compare Trial Tr., V01.

that

(Trial Tr., V01.

L.17.) Although Joslin argued

were “consistent With a type of autoerotic asphyxiation”

0n cross—examination

II,

In addition, analysis of swabs obtained

from C.D. and Joslin conﬁrmed the presence 0f Joslin’s semen
II,

(Trial Tr., V01.

II,

p.166, Ls.18-22 (emergency

(Trial

TL, V01.

room physician

II,

testifying

he “suppose[d]” the hemorrhaging in C.D.’s eyes could be consistent

with “[t]he amount of pressure” involved With “any sort of autoerotic asphyxiation,” but
explaining he

assault nurse

was “not

sure

how much pressure

is

involved in

that”)).

and the emergency room physician testiﬁed, based 0n

of C.D., that C.D. had been the Victim 0f a sexual

assault.

Moreover, both the sexual

their respective examinations

(Trial Tr., V01.

II,

p.161, Ls.18-24,

p.3 13, Ls.15-20.)

Unlike cases in which

this

Court has been able t0 declare an error harmless because there

was n0 physical 0r other evidence corroborating
at 11-12,

304 P.3d

at

the Victim’s testimony,

286-87, Johnson, 148 Idaho at 669-70, 227 P.3d

ﬂ, gg, J_oy,
at

155 Idaho

923-24, the physical

evidence and eye-witness testimony in this case overwhelmingly corroborated C.D.’s testimony
that Joslin strangled

and raped

her.

court’s limiting instruction, there

is

Considering the strength of

no reasonable

35

this evidence, together

with the

possibility that the challenged 404(b) evidence

contributed to the jury’s verdict.

and did not

Any

error in the admission 0f the evidence

was thus harmless

affect Joslin’s substantial rights.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

DATED this

Court afﬁrm the judgment of conviction.

17th day 0f April, 2019.

/s/

Lori A. Fleming

LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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